Area Descriptions:
Page Description - this page contains information related to the art,
science, and act of regulation.
Regulating:
- How
Performance Measures Can Improve Regulation - 2010-06 - by the
National Regulatory Research Institute -
http://www.EnergyCollection.us/Energy-Regulators/Performance-Measures.pdf
- Partners for Tough Times - keeping electric utilities financially
healthy requires a partnership, with regulators making decisions that
support good financial planning by companies -
http://www.EnergyCollection.us/Energy-Regulators/Partners-Tough-Times.pdf
- Pre-Approval Commitments: When And Under What Conditions Should
Regulators Commit Ratepayer Dollars to Utility-Proposed Capital Projects?
- by
NRRI -
42 pages - 2008 - 11 - Until the last quarter of the 20th century, utility
regulators commonly made cost recovery decisions concerning new capital
projects only after construction was completed and the facility had entered
commercial operation. The key aspect of this traditional approach is timing
i.e., that whatever regulatory decision is made with respect to the
rate-making treatment of construction costs occurs “after the fact,” i.e.,
after the utility has incurred the costs at issue. Deciding only after a
project is completed whether to allow rate recovery means that (1) cost
recovery does not begin until the utility seeks and obtains a rate increase;
and (2) during construction, the utility has to obtain outside (i.e., non
ratepayer) sources of funds to finance the project. Some state commissions,
based on traditional statutes or recent amendments, are breaking from this
traditional approach, thereby providing some level or form of cost recovery
assurance prior to commercial operation (and sometimes prior to commencement
of construction). Stimulating these new approaches are multiple factors:
growing demand, aging infrastructure, environmental requirements, an
increasing call for the construction of renewable projects, and shrinking
credit markets. These considerations have led utilities to seek upfront
regulatory commitments before expressing a willingness to pursue even much
needed major capital projects. This paper addresses the many and conflicting
considerations raised when a utility asks a commission to commit to cost
recovery in advance of the regulated utility’s completion or, perhaps, even
the initiation of construction of a major capital project -
http://www.EnergyCollection.us/Energy-Planning/Pre-Approval-Commitments.pdf.
- A Primer on Public Utility Regulation
for New State Regulatory Commissioners - 2003-04-01 - 26 pages -
http://www.EnergyCollection.us/Energy-Regulators/Primer-Public-Utility.pdf
- Rate Case and Audit Manual - 2003-06-01 - 52 pages - This
manual has been prepared by the National Association of Regulatory Utility
Commissioners (NARUC) Staff Subcommittee on Accounting and Finance as a
guideline for state, territory, and federal regulatory utility commission
personnel. It is not our intent to provide a checklist for use by commission
auditors, accountants or analysts . Rather, it is our intent to set forth
the most common, basic regulatory principles, processes, and procedures used
by many regulatory commissions to examine and investigate general rate
applications. We anticipate that each regulatory jurisdiction will have
areas of uniqueness and specific areas of differences when it comes to
examining a utility’s revenue requirement and operating earnings.
Recognizing that these differences exist, we have tried to present the basic
steps of the rate case investigation in such a way that revisions and
changes can be made by the individual jurisdictions while maintaining the
overall usefulness of the more general guidelines -
http://www.EnergyCollection.us/Energy-Regulators/Rate-Case-Audit.pdf
- Smart Grid Issues in State Law and Regulation - The issue this white paper from the Galvin Electricity Initiative tackles is
how to determine what legal and regulatory relics of an earlier era are
still present and may serve as barriers to, or enablers of, the full,
economically justifiable deployment and exploitation of smart grid
technology -
http://www.EnergyCollection.us/Energy-Smart-Grid/SG-Issues-Law.pdf
-
Texans own their own
meter data - "All meter data, including all data generated, provided,
or otherwise made available, by advanced meters and meter information networks, shall belong to a
customer, including data used to calculate charges for service, historical load data, and any other
proprietary customer information." Link:
http://law.onecle.com/texas/utilities/39.107.00.html
- Toward an End-to-End Smart Grid: Overcoming Bottlenecks to
Facilitate Competition and Innovation in Smart Grids - 41 pages -
2011-06-01 - Policy makers, practitioners, and researchers are focusing more
than ever on smart grid infrastructures due to energy systems impact on
society and the economy. By integrating a communications and control system
with the existing power grid, smart grids provide end-o-end connectivity
which enables near to real-time data exchange among all actors and
components in the electricity system s value chain. Dependent on the smart
grid communications network s availability, the way electricity is
generated, delivered, and consumed can be improved and optimized. Also new
services, applications, and technologies can emerge that will also aid to
improve and optimize the use of electricity. End-to-end communication
requires initially developing the missing communications link between
consumers premises and the rest of the energy network (the last mile) by
deploying an Advanced Metering Infrastructure (AMI), along with smart
meters. Given the German metering and electricity markets
characteristics—which is comparable to many liberalized markets—incumbent
distribution system operators (DSOs) are likely to control the smart grids
last mile. The last-mile infrastructure cannot be substituted or replicated
within a reasonable time and cost frame. Moreover, together with the meter
data, the infrastructure provides an essential input allowing efficient
downstream markets, i.e. complementary services, products, and applications,
to emerge. Such developments give rise to concerns about
anti-competitiveness. This paper s goal is to analyze whether such concerns
are justified, since anticompetitive behavior would impede interoperability
s emergence, distort competition, and harm innovation and social welfare.
The analysis shows that, contrary to the Chicago School s rationale
regarding vertical integration, DSOs have incentives to discriminate against
new market entrants by leveraging entry barriers. We discuss possible
regulatory remedies by building upon insights gained in telecommunications
regulation. We also consider the implications for theory and regulation, and
make recommendations for further research.
http://www.EnergyCollection.us/Energy-Regulators/Toward-End-End.pdf